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THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF ERISA ON
THE PREVAILING WAGE ACT
SCOTT D. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION

Questions remain whether the Prevailing Wage Act' (PWA)
is enforceable in light of Construction and General Laborers' District Council of Chicago and Vicinity v. McHugh Construction
Co. 2 The PWA is the Illinois statute that requires contractors and
subcontractors to pay laborers, workers and mechanics employed
on public works projects, no less than the general prevailing rate
of wages (consisting of hourly cash wages plus fringe benefits)3
for work of a similar character in the locality where the work is
performed.4 The Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL) administers
and enforces the Act 5 by investigating, determining and enforcing
* Scott D. Miller is legal counsel for the Illinois Department of Labor. He
earned his B.S. from the State University of New York at Oswego in 1981 and his
J.D. in 1990 from Hamline University School of Law (cum laude), where he was an
editor of the Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy.
The views expressed in this Article are the author's and do not necessarily
represent those of the Illinois Department of Labor.
1. 820 ILCS 130/0.01-12 (1994).
2. 596 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1992).
3. 820 ILCS 130/2 (1994).
Laws 703 (requiring payment of the
4. See Law of June 26, 1941, § 1, 1941 Ill.
prevailing wage to laborers on all public works); Bradley v. Casey, 114 N.E.2d 681,
1953) (addressing the 1941 Act as a serious policy statement).
683 (Ill.
One purpose of the PWA was to "assure that people working on public works
projects receive a decent wage in order to secure . . . 'the advantage to the state of
having the work performed under conditions which give some assurance that the
work will be completed without interruptions or delay by workmen of average
skill.'" Hayen v. County of Ogle, 463 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ill. 1984) (quoting Bradley,
114 N.E.2d at 686 (quoting Long Island R.R. Co. v. Department of Labor, 177 N.E.
17, 22 (N.Y. 1931))). Further, the Illinois Legislature intended the Act to protect
both local workers and contractors "who have to compete with out-of-state cheap,
itinerant labor for public works contracts." H.B. 568, 86th Ill. Gen. Assembly,
House Debates, 65th Leg. Day, 22 (June 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Homer discussing "a fundamental policy that the legislature adopted when it adopted the
Prevailing Wage Rate Act."). See also Bernardi v. Highland Park, 520 N.E.2d 316,
320 (Ill. 1988) (explaining that the PWA "remov(es] the incentive to import less
expensive labor from areas outside the locality in which the work is being performed.").
5. 820 ILCS 130/6 (1994). In construing the PWA, IDOL relies on both the
historical origins and evolving political history of the Act, thus supporting the rule
of law by countering the impact of current politics on its decisions. See People v.
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the minimum wage rates that an employer must pay on public
works contracts.6 The PWA further provides workers with a private cause of action for the collection of the general prevailing
wage for their services rendered on public works projects.7
In McHugh, the Laborers' Council filed a private PWA action
to recover a subcontractor's delinquent welfare and pension contributions (fringe benefits) to an employee benefit plan.' The Illinois
Appellate Court, First District, held that the Laborers' PWA claim
was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 19749 (ERISA), the federal statute that regulates employee
Easley, 519 N.E.2d 914, 916 (Ill.
1988) (explaining that Illinois courts examine the
evolving history of a statute to ascertain its legislative intent); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 237-38
(Harvard University Press) (1990) (proposing interpretive principles for the regulatory state); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretationand the Problem of Legislative History,
66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321 (1990) (examining agencies' interpretation and use
of legislative history); see generally Mark Barenberg, The PoliticalEconomy of the
Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379,
1381-96 (1993) (examining the NLRA's origins and statutory scheme by drawing
from archival materials and oral history).
IDOL's role in the administration and enforcement of the Act has evolved
significantly over the past 54 years. A chronological list of legislation delineating
IDOL's role is as follows: Law of June 26, 1941, § 5, 1941 Il.Laws 703, 705 (granting IDOL authority to inspect the records of contractors and subcontractors); Law
of July 11, 1957, §§ 4, 6-9, 1957 Ill.
Laws 2662, 2663-66 (authorizing IDOL to ascertain the prevailing wage rates upon the public body's request; requiring IDOL
to investigate and prosecute violations of the Act); Law of Sept. 2, 1983, § 9, 1983
Ill. Laws 1763, 1763-65 (requiring IDOL to ascertain the prevailing wage rates
when the public body does not investigate and ascertain the rates pursuant to the
previous paragraph); Law of Sept. 23, 1983, § 11, 1983 Ill. Laws 4261, 4261-62
(empowering IDOL to take assignments and collect underpayments of wages); Law
of Sept. 24, 1983, § 11a, 1983 Ill.
Laws 3779 (authorizing IDOL to debar contractors and subcontractors); Law of Jan. 5, 1984, § 11, 1984 Ill.
Laws 7160, 7161
(amending IDOL's powers to enjoin the awarding of contracts or the continuation
of work); Law of Sept. 7, 1989, §§ 4, 11, 11a, 1989 Ill. Laws 4208, 4209-12 (requiring all contracts to reflect IDOL's revised rates; authorizing IDOL to collect wage
underpayment penalties and to convene debarment hearings); Law of Jan. 1, 1983,
§ 1la, 1989 Ill. Laws 3779 (requiring IDOL to publish a list of debarred contractors
or subcontractors on a quarterly basis); Law of Aug. 16, 1993, § 16, 1993 Ill.
Laws
2772, 2772-73 (charging IDOL with the duty to investigate whistleblower claims
and "make whole" such employees or employee representatives).
6. The PWA provides a minimum wage rate on public works projects. See 820
ILCS 130/1 (1994) (declaring the policy that laborers, mechanics and workers on
public projects shall be paid "a wage of no less than the general prevailing hourly
rate"); 820 ILCS 130/7 (1994) (stating that the PWA does not prohibit employers
from paying "more than the prevailing rate"); Bernardi v. Roofing Sys., Inc., 463
N.E.2d 123, 124 (Ill. 1984) (quoting Hayen, 463 N.E.2d at 128 (stating that the
legislative scheme embodies the "legislature's decision to stabilize labor conditions
on public works projects by creating a prevailing wage base")).
-7. 820 ILCS 130/11 (1994).
8. McHugh, 596 N.E.2d at 20.
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
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benefit plans."0
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the PWA,
and IDOL's enforcement thereof, are not preempted by ERISA
relative to IDOL ascertaining the prevailing rate of wages and
collecting employees' prevailing wages. The principles underlying
the ERISA preemption doctrine are reviewed, followed by a discussion of case law from other jurisdictions that illustrate the
current trend of ERISA's preemptive effect on state prevailing
wage statutes. Additionally, the definition of "prevailing rate of
wages" under the PWA is examined. The discourse concludes with
an application of the current trend in ERISA preemption analysis
to the PWA and its enforcement by IDOL.
I.

THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING

ERISA

PREEMPTION OF

STATE LAW

Statutes which Congress establishes pursuant to the Constitution are "the supreme Law of the Land."" In effect, the Constitution "gives Congress the power to preempt state law." 2
Ascertaining Congress' intent in enacting a particular law is
essential in determining whether a federal act preempts a state
statute. 3 Federal preemption of state law "may be either express
or implied, and 'is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in
14
its structure and purpose.'"'
ERISA is an act of Congress "made in pursuance" 5 of the
U.S. Constitution. 6 Thus, ERISA is the "supreme Law of the

Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1994)).
10. McHugh, 596 N.E.2d at 23-24.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. In pertinent part, the Supremacy Clause states:
[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
12. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 505, 509 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(quoting Mowery v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012,
1013 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding that ERISA preempts state law claims against a
welfare benefit plan arising from a mental patient's suicide)), af'd, 48 F.3d 937
(6th Cir. 1995).
13. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) (holding that
ERISA preempted New York's Human Rights Law).
14. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
16. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S.
Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1983) (discussing ERISA's preemptive effect over a state action to levy taxes on funds held by a welfare benefit trust).
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Land" and any state statute that ERISA preempts violates the
Constitution. 7
The purpose of ERISA is to safeguard workers (and their
beneficiaries) from abuse and mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance employee benefit plans.'" The statute defines the
phrase "employee benefit plan" to include both pension and welfare plans. 9 Under the act, a pension plan provides income deferral or retirement income. 20 A welfare plan furnishes "medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services.. .21
ERISA comprehensively regulates employee benefit plans
relating to participation, funding, vesting, reporting, disclosure
and fiduciary responsibilities. 22 ERISA does not regulate the substantive content of welfare-benefit plans.23
The preemptive effect of ERISA on state law is deliberately
expansive. 24 The statute contains three provisions defining "the
extent to which state law is preempted with regard to employee
benefit plans."2 ' The "preemptive clause" states that:
[elxcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the savings
clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.... 6

The "savings clause" provides that:
[elxcept as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, bank-

17. See, e.g., Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 588, 593-94 (lst Cir.
1995) (finding that ERISA preempted a Massachusetts statute requiring general
contractors working on public works projects to furnish a bond to secure payment
of arty sums due to trustees for health and welfare plans: "when the Supremacy
Clause is implicated, federal law trumps state law, not vice versa"), petition for
cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3819 (U.S. May 2, 1995) (No. 94-1804).
18. ERISA § 4(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc., v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 15 (quoting ERISA's House sponsor at 120 CONG. REC. 29197
(1974)).
19. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
20. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
21. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
22. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
23. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91.
24. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1990) (discussing ERISA's design and holding that ERISA preempted a Texas common-law
wrongful discharge action alleging that an employer terminated an employee to
avoid making pension fund contributions).
25. Tolton, 854 F. Supp. at 509.
26. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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ing, or securities."

The "deemer clause" explains that:
[n]either an employee benefit plan.., nor any trust established
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies. 28
The Supreme Court summarized the "pure mechanics of the
[three] provisions" as follows:
[i]f a state law "relate[s] to ... employee benefit plan[s]," it is preempted. § 514 (a). The saving clause excepts from the preemption
clause laws that "regulat[e] insurance." § 514(b)(2)(A). The deemer
clause makes clear that a state law that "purport[s] to regulate
insurance" cannot deem an employee
benefit plan to be an insur29
ance company. § 514(b)(2)(B).
Note that ERISA defines "State law" to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of
law.. . ." In addition, the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended to use the words "relate to" in their "broad sense,"
rejecting language that would limit preemption "to state laws
relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA."3'
There are, however, limits to ERISA's preemptive scope. In
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,32 the Supreme Court held
that a Maine statute requiring businesses to make lump-sum
severance payments to employees (who were not covered by an
express severance pay agreement) when they close plants in the
State did not "relate to" an ERISA plan.33 The Court reasoned
that the law did not require an employer to establish or maintain
a plan to coordinate and control periodic demands on its assets.'
Additionally, in Massachusetts v. Morash,35 the Supreme
Court held that "payroll practices" that include the payment of
unused vacation benefits from an employer's "general assets"
rather than from a trust fund are not employee welfare benefit

27. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
28. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
29. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) (holding that ERISA
preempted a Mississippi common-law action alleging that an employer improperly
processed a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated benefit plan).
30. ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
31. Shaw, 483 U.S. at 98.
32. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 19, 23.
35. 490 U.S. 107 (1989).
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plans under ERISA.3" The Court explained that "[t]he States
have traditionally regulated the payment of wages, including
vacation pay. Absent any indication that Congress intended such
far-reaching consequences, we are reluctant to so significantly
interfere with 'the separate spheres of government authority preserved in our federalist system."'37
Relying on Morash, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, in Tap Electronic Contracting Service, Inc. v.
Hartnett,38 held that ERISA did not preempt the New York Department of Labor's regulation of an employer's vacation and
holiday supplement payments under New York Labor Code § 220
(Public Works).39 The evidence indicated that the employer provided its employees the supplements through its general assets,
not from a trust fund.4 °
In addition, the U.S. District Court, Northern District of
California (also relying on Morash) held in Czechowski v. Tandy
Corp.4 ' that an employer's unfunded vacation benefits trust was
not an ERISA welfare benefit plan.42 The court reasoned that the
trust did not "implicate any concerns over mismanagement since
no funds [were] accumulated in it." 43 The trust at issue distribut-

ed one million dollars in vacation pay, but never maintained more
than one thousand dollars in its account." As a result, the employer was subject to the provisions of California Labor Code §
227.3 prohibiting the company from effecting a forfeiture of a
separated employee's earned vacation time.45
Finally, the California Court of Appeals held in Millan v.
Restaurant Enterprise Group, Inc.46 that the California Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement could subpoena vacation trust
fund records to determine whether the trust was a Czechowski
type subterfuge, thus subjecting the employer to the requirements
of California Labor Code § 227.3. 47 The state agency in Millan
sought information evidencing a company's payment of accrued
vacation pay to separated employees. 48 The company argued that
the subpoena was excessive because ERISA only required it to

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 119 (quoting Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 19).
549 N.Y.S.2d 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
Id. at 120.
Id.
731 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id.
Id.
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 204-05.
Id. at 208.
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file, rather than maintain, such records.4 9 The court determined
that the subpoena was not unreasonable because an administrative agency has the authority to conduct an investigation to determine whether an entity is subject to its jurisdiction and whether
there has been a violation of a law that it is charged to enforce.5"
Note that the holding in Millan is analogous to Illinois case
law addressing an administrative agency's authority to investigate
employers. For example, in Vissering Mercantile Co. v.
Annunzio,5' the Illinois Supreme Court found that IDOL could
investigate an employer's books and records to determine the
business' compliance with the Wages of Women and Minors
Act.52 The Act empowers IDOL to ascertain and enforce minimum 3 wage rates per trade or occupation for women and mi5
nors.

II. TRENDS IN ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE PREVAILING
WAGE STATUTES

Current case law indicates a trend in which courts are becoming increasingly reluctant to find that ERISA preempts state
prevailing wage statutes. Part of this trend is a recognition that
ERISA does not expressly preempt state prevailing wage statutes
that include benefit payments (rather than contributions to benefit plans) within the total amount of prevailing wages that a contractor must pay its workers engaged in a public works project.5 4
Thus, at issue, is whether a state prevailing wage law, and/or the
enforcement thereof, is preempted by implication because it "relates to" an ERISA plan. 5
States apply one of three methods to determine whether a
contractor or subcontractor has made the requisite cash payments
and benefits contributions to comply with the applicable prevail-

49. Id. at 207.
50. Id. at 205 (citing Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 215-17
(1946) (permitting the USDOL to subpoena documents in a FLSA investigation)).
51. 115 N.E.2d 306 (Ill. 1953).
52. 820 ILCS 125/0.01-17 (1994).
53. Annunzio, 115 N.E.2d at 311-12 (citing Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 327 U.S.
at 215-17).
54. See Minn. Chapter of Assoc. Builders and Contractors, Inc., v. Minn. Dep't
of Labor and Indus., 47 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that "although
ERISA preempts a state law which explicitly refers to a benefit plan regulated by
ERISA.... this preemption applies only to references to benefit plans, and not
references to benefits"); WSB Elec., Inc. v. Curry, 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
508, 514 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Fort Halifax for the proposition that the "language 'related to any employee benefit plan' is intended to distinguish between
relating to a benefit plan and otherwise relating to benefits.").
55. See, e.g., Minn. Chapter of Assoc. Builders and Contractors,Inc., 47 F.3d at
977 (inquiring whether the PWA is implicitly preempted by ERISA).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 29:55

ing wage statute. The first procedure is the "line by line" method.
Under this system, an enforcement agency:
determine[s] the prevailing rate of cash wages and of each specific
benefit included in the statute; the total of all of these [is considered the "prevailing wage." To comply with the prevailing wage
laws, a contractor [may] either pay at least the total amount of the
prevailing [hourly] wages in cash wages, or pay a combination of at
least the prevailing cash [hourly] wages plus countable benefit contributions added up to at least the total amount of prevailing wages.
However, for each specified fringe benefit, only contributions up to
the prevailing rates for that benefit [ar]e countable. Thus contractors [ar]e not entitled to any credit for benefits which [ar]e not prevailing benefits in the area or for benefit payment in excess of the
prevailing rate for that benefit.5"
The second procedure is the "two tier system." Under this
method, a contractor pays the total amount of the general prevailing wage in cash or:
pay[s] a combination of at least the prevailing cash [hourly] wages,
plus benefit contributions adding up to at least the total amount of
the prevailing wages. The difference from the "line by line" scheme
is that legitimate statutory benefits contributions are countable
even if they exceed the prevailing rates for that specific benefit or
are for different benefits than the prevailing benefits.... However,
as with the "line by line" system, a contractor is still required to pay
the prevailing cash [hourly] wages; it is not entitled to a credit
against the prevailing cash wages for benefit payments in excess of
the prevailing rate for benefits.57
The third scheme is the "total package (Davis-Bacon)" method.5" Under this scheme, a contractor may pay any combination
of cash wages and benefits contributions (prevailing and/or nonprevailing benefits) that add up to the total prevailing wage.59
A. The "Line by Line" Method
Courts have uniformly found that the "line by line" method is
preempted by ERISA. A divided panel of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, in General Electric Co. v. New York Department of
Labor,60 decided that ERISA preempted New York Labor Law §
220 (Public Work). 1 Section 220 required employers on public
works to pay "supplements" in accordance with local prevailing

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Curry, 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 510.
Id.
Id.
Id.
891 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990).
Id. at 29.
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practices. 62 The statute defined the term "supplements" to include "health, welfare, nonoccupational disability, retirement,
vacation benefits, holiday pay and life insurance."63
Specifically, the New York State Commissioner of Labor prohibited General Electric from substituting a supplement that the
Commissioner deemed a "prevailing benefit" for another form of
supplement (for example, a pension or welfare plan required by
the company's collective bargaining agreement). 64 The
Commissioner's position was in accordance with the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division decision in A.L. Blades &
Sons, Inc. v. Roberts,6 5 which held that "the statute indicates
that the legislature intended that the Commissioner of Labor, not
the contractor, determine the supplements to be provided and that
the employee receive either the listed benefits or equivalent cash
(or a combination of both)."6 6
As a result, the Second Circuit determined that Section 220
"intrude[d]" in the primary administrative functions of an employee benefit plan (e.g., the statute proscribed the type and amount
of an employer's contribution to a plan, the rules under which the
plan operates, and the nature and amount of the benefits provided
by the plan).67 As a result, the Court held that Section 220 "related to" employee benefit plans and was therefore preempted by
6
ERISA. 1
B. The "Two Tier" Method
California abandoned its "line by line" enforcement of the
California Labor Code for the "two tier" method when a federal
district court held that the former procedure was preempted by
ERISA. s9 Under Section 1773.1 of the Code, the general prevailing rate of per diem wages includes an employer's payments "for
health and welfare, pension, vacation, travel time and subsistence
70
pay."
Nonetheless, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District

62. Id.
63. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220(5)(b) (Consol. 1994).
64. GeneralElec., 891 F.2d at 27.
65. 524 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. App. Div.) (mem.), appeal denied, 72 N.Y.2d 803
(N.Y. 1988).
66. Id. at 914.
67. GeneralElec., 891 F.2d at 29.
68. Id.
69. Curry, 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 508-09.
70. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1773.1 (West 1994). See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§
16000, 16200 (1994) (including within the General Prevailing Rate of Per Diem
Wages, an employer's payments for medical and hospital care, retirement plan
benefits, vacation and holidays, compensation for injuries, insurance and unemployment, among other payments).
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of California, in Associated Builders v. Baca,7 held that the ordi-

nances of two cities and one county requiring the payment of
prevailing wages (as established under the California Labor Code)
on private projects was preempted by ERISA. v2 The Baca court
noted that ERISA preemption would not have been implicated if
the administrative scheme necessitated only the payment of cash
wages.73
The court reasoned that the definition of "per diem wages"
causes the reference to, and calculation of, an employer's contributions to benefit plans.7 4 Thus, unlike the Maine severance pay
statute discussed in Fort Halifax,7 5 the prevailing wage ordinances at issue obligated an employer to create an administrative
system to process periodic benefit payments. 76 The Baca court
buttressed its holding by asserting that the "two tier" method discouraged employers from contributing in excess of the prevailing
benefit amounts because they would not be credited for such payment by being able to compensate workers below the base wage
level. 7
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California later upheld the "two tier" method in WSB Electric, Inc. v.
Curry.7

Relying on Morash and Fort Halifax, the Curry court

noted that "payment of prevailing cash wages out of an employer's
general assets without credit for higher than prevailing benefit
contributions does
not constitute a benefit plan within the mean79
ing of ERISA."

The Curry court applied the Ninth Circuit's ERISA preemption test to answer the threshold question, "whether the state law
'relates to' an employee welfare benefit plan, i.e. 'has a connection
with or reference to such a plan.'"' ° Specifically, the test asked:
is the state telling employers how to write their ERISA plans, or
conditioning some requirement on how they write their ERISA
plans? Or is it telling them that regardless of how they write their
ERISA plans, they must do something else outside and independently of the ERISA plans? If the latter, as here, there is no preemption.8'

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
fax.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

769 F. Supp. 1537 (N.D. Cal. 1991).

Id. at 1547.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fort HaliBaca, 769 F. Supp. at 1547.
Id. at 1548.
2 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 508, 511 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Id. at 510.
Id. (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97).
Id. at 511 (quoting Employee Staffing Serv. Inc. v. Aubry, 20 F.3d 1038,
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The Curry court held that California is telling employers
"that regardless of how they write their ERISA plans, or even
whether they have ERISA plans, they must pay prevailing cash
wages and prevailing total compensation. Accordingly, there is no
preemption. s2
The court noted that minimum wage laws (e.g., the FLSA and
its state counterparts) and the "total package" scheme (both of
which the plaintiff properly acknowledged were not preempted by
ERISA) are neither logically nor legally distinguishable from the
"two tier" enforcement method. 3 Minimum wage laws set a floor
for cash wages, thus arguably discouraging the payment of benefits "exceeding the difference between the total prevailing wage
and the minimum wage. The challenged second tier of the instant
statute merely raises that minimum wage higher than the cash
wages Plaintiffs wish to pay."8" Finally, the court found Baca
distinguishable on the basis that the ordinances affected private
construction, and thus fell outside the "important factor of the
state's traditional
exercise of the authority to set wages for state85
funded projects."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Keystone Chapter,
Associate Builders and Contractors v. Foley8 6 upheld the Penn-7
sylvania Prevailing Wage Act and the regulations thereunder.
The Third Circuit first addressed a declaratory order of the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Review Board. 8 Pursuant to the order,
ERISA benefits were "per se bona fide."89 The Board must approve all other contributions. 0 Further, ERISA benefit contributions would count towards the benefits minimum, however, nonERISA contributions would count only if they were in one of the
predetermined benefit categories. 91 The Court concluded that the
order was a state law9" preempted by ERISA93 because it "single[d] out [ERISA] plans for special treatment."

1041 (9th Cir. 1994)).
82. Id.
83. 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 508, 511 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
84. Id. at 511-12.
85. Id. at 513.
86. 37 F.3d 945 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1393 (1995).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 955.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id.

91. Id.
92. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion stating that
ERISA § 514(c)(1) defines "state laws" to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law."
93. Keystone, 37 F.3d at 956 (quoting United Wire, Etc. v. Morristown Mem.
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382, 382-83 (1993)).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[Vol. 29:55

The Keystone court did not invalidate the statute and regulations upon finding the Board's "line by line" analysis preempted
by ERISA. Rather, the Court held that the act and regulations
were not preempted by ERISA because there was at least one
reasonable interpretation of the legislation and rules (that the
agency was free to adopt) that was not preempted. 4
The regulations clarified that the prevailing minimum wage
had two separate components: a cash wage and a level of benefits
contributions. Contractors and subcontractors must pay "[nlot less
than the general prevailing minimum wage rates."9 5 If a company does not contribute toward employee benefits "which the Secretary has determined to be included in the general prevailing minimum wage rate," that employer may pay "the monetary equivalent thereof."9" In addition, the regulations defined contributions
for employee benefits as "[flringe benefits' paid or to be paid, including payment made whether directly or indirectly, to the workmen for sick, disability, death, other than Workmen's Compensation, medical, surgical, hospital, vacation, travel expense, retirement and pension benefits."97
The Third Circuit found that the statute and regulations:
merely require that the Secretary set a prevailing wage that consists of a cash component and may include a benefits component.
Employers must pay the cash component of the wage in cash, but
they may pay the benefits compensation either in benefits or cash.
Any benefits they provide, regardless of type, would count toward
the benefits component. Under this interpretation, the Prevailing
Wage Act and the regulations do not control benefits, but rather
require certain wages to be paid. 8
Thus, the court determined that the state statute did not directly
relate to ERISA plans. The statute could operate in the absence of
any ERISA plans because the Secretary's measurement of prevailing benefits contributions may be satisfied by benefits "payable on
a regular basis from the general assets of the employer,"99 and
would "create[] no need for an ongoing administrative program for
0°
processing claims and paying benefits."'
The Third Circuit further determined that the Pennsylvania
Prevailing Wage Act was not indirectly related to ERISA plans.
Addressing the cash component, the court found that a minimum
cash payment requirement did not restrict an employer's choice of

94. Id.
95. 34 PA. CODE § 9.106 (1994).
96. Id.
97. 34 PA. CODE § 9.102 (1994).

98. Keystone, 37 F.3d at 956.
99. Id. at 957-58 (quoting Morash, 490 U.S. at 116).
100. Id. at 958 (quoting Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12).
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plan benefits and structures.'' Following Morash (vacation benefits) and Fort Halifax (a one time severance payment), the court
concluded that "[a] state law does not dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans by having nothing to do with employee benefits."' 2 The fact that an employer must adjust its operations according to the locality is a reality that arises out of a federalist
system of government.0 3
Addressing the benefits component, the Third Circuit found
that the statute relates to ERISA only when an employer decides
to satisfy the requisite level of benefits contributions through
contributions to an ERISA plan, rather than cash payment or
contributions to non-ERISA benefits.'O° Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 15 the
Third Circuit concluded that:
where a legal requirement may be easily satisfied through means
unconnected to ERISA plans, and only relates to ERISA plans at
the election of an employer, it 'affect[s] employee benefit plans in
too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding
that the law 'relates to' the plan.""' 6 The Third Circuit further
concluded that the statute's records and reporting requirements
did
07
not impede the ability of plans to operate nationally.'
Finally, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, in Associated Builders and Contractors,Saginaw Valley
Area v. Perry,'° held that the Michigan Prevailing Wage Act
was preempted by ERISA.' °9 Relying on Baca, the court found
that the Michigan Department of Labor's "two tier" enforcement
method "related to" ERISA plans because it discouraged employers from contributing in excess of the prevailing benefit
amounts."0 Furthermore, the court found the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Keystone unpersuasive."' Emphasizing that the
phrase "relates to" should be broadly construed, the Perry court
chastised the Third Circuit for engrafting:
a two-step analysis onto a one-step statute, first finding that the
benefits component of the prevailing wage act had "some connection" to (i.e., was related to) employee benefit plans, then finding no

101. Id.
102. Id. at 959.
103. Keystone, 37 F.3d at 960.
104. Id.
105. 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (finding that ERISA did not preempt a N.Y. law requiring paid sick-leave benefits for employees unable to work because of pregnancy).
106. Keystone, 37 F.3d at 960 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21).
107. Id. at 963.
108. 869 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1994).

109. Id. at 1245.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1246.
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preemption because employers could comply with the law by not
paying any benefits if they paid a sufficiently high cash wages."'
The District Court also followed the Baca court's findings that a
two-tier prevailing wage scheme required an ongoing administrative system. As a result, the court concluded that the Michigan
statute was directly related to an ERISA plan and was therefore
preempted by ERISA."'
Perry is unconvincing and easily distinguishable. First, the
District Court relied heavily on the analysis in Baca. The decision
in Baca discussed local ordinances affecting wage rates on private
construction, and was thus a poor choice for a doctrinal foundation to analyze a state statute dealing with wage rates for public
works projects. As pointed out in Curry (distinguishing Baca) the
ordinances at issue fell outside the traditional exercise of state
powers that courts are otherwise reluctant to preempt by implication. The Michigan statute, however, fit within the traditional
boundaries of state regulatory authority. Thus, the Perry court
failed to apply the proper ERISA preemption analysis when it
examined the Michigan statute.
Second, the Perry court's attack on Keystone was mistaken.
Keystone did not effect a "two-step analysis," but rather, adhered
to the precedent providing deference to traditional exercises of
state authority, unless preemption is unavoidable.
C. "Total Package (Davis-Bacon)"Method
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Minnesota Chapter of
Associate Builders and Contractors v. Department of Labor and
Industry,"4 held that ERISA did not expressly or implicitly preempt the Minnesota Prevailing Wage Law. 5 The statute defines the prevailing wage rate as "[tihe hourly basic rate of pay
plus the contribution for health and welfare benefits, vacation
benefits, pension benefits, and any other economic benefit." 6
An employer may comply with the law by dividing the wage rate
"between wages and benefits as it chooses, so long as the combined total meets or exceeds the prevailing wage rate." 7 The
court noted that the Minnesota law was less restrictive than the
New York and Pennsylvania statutes."' Under the Minnesota
law:

112. Id.

113. Perry, 869 F. Supp. at 1246.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

47 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 979.
MINN. STAT. § 177.42(6) (1994).
Minn. Chapter of Assoc. Builders and Contractors,Inc., 47 F.3d at 977.
Id. at 979.
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economic benefits are interchangeable for other economic benefits or
for wages, thus eliminating governmental control over benefits
provided or compensated for in the form of supplements, as well as
creating only a minimal administrative burden [requiring payroll
data on public works projects - information that the State would
require even if benefits were excluded from the scheme]." 9
III. DEFINING "PREVAILING RATE OF WAGES" UNDER THE
PREVAILING WAGE ACT
Section 2 of the PWA defines the phrase "prevailing rate of
wages" as "the hourly cash wages plus fringe benefits for health
and welfare, insurance, vacation and pensions generally."12 °
This provision is similar to the definition of prevailing wages used
by the California, Minnesota, New York and Pennsylvania prevailing wage statutes.' 2 ' As a rule, when "construing an Illinois
statute, decisions of other States construing similar laws are entitled to respect and consideration." 2 2 Thus, the California, Minnesota, New York and Pennsylvania case law interpreting the
statutory phrase "prevailing rate of wages," (while not binding)
provides excellent guidance in the construction of the phrase in
the PWA.
As evidenced by a 1993 Attorney General Opinion, 23 IDOL
has historically enforced the PWA in accordance with a "line by
line" approach, analogous to the method struck down in General
Electric.24 Specifically, the Attorney General's opinion stated
that:

119. Id. at 977.
120. 820 ILCS 130/2 (1994).
121. See supra notes 63, 73, 95-96, 116 and accompanying text.
122. Urban v. Loham, 592 N.E.2d 292, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (quoting In re
Marriage of Hunt, 397 N.E.2d 511, 517 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). See also 2B NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONSTR. § 52.03 (5th ed. 1992) ("[Tlhe phraseology and
language of similar legislation in other jurisdictions is deserving of special consideration not only in the interests of uniformity, but also for the purpose of determining the general policy and objectives of a particular course of legislation."); Bradley
v. Casey, 114 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1953) (referencing N.Y. case law to buttress the
conclusion that the phrase "prevailing wage" provided an adequate standard for
ascertaining wage rates, thus overcoming due process concerns); McHugh, 596
N.E.2d at 22-24 (canvassing the case law of other jurisdictions to ascertain when a
state law "relates to" an ERISA plan). See also Golden Bear Family Restaurants,
Inc. v. Murray, 494 N.E.2d 581, 589 (Ill. App. Ct.) (buttressing the construction of
IWPCA § 5 (pro-rated vesting of vacation pay) by agreeing with the California
Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar provision (Section 227) of the California Labor Code), appeal denied, 112 Ill. 2d 574 (1986).
123. Op. Ill. Att'y Gen. No. 93-009 (Mar. 29, 1993).
124. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of General
Elec.
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the Department interprets the requirement that workers be paid no
less than the prevailing rate of wages to mean that the worker
must be paid at least or above the prevailing rate for each category

of benefits; the prevailing wage requirement cannot be satisfied by
paying any combination of cash and fringe benefit hourly rates the
sum of which equals the sum total of the rates determined by the
Department, even though cash equivalents may be paid to workers
for fringe benefits in lieu of providing the fringe benefits.' 2 '

The opinion further recognized that there were two other
possible interpretations of the phrase "prevailing rate of wages,"
one comparable to the "two-tier" computation method, and the

other one analogous to the "total package (Davis-Bacon)" method. 126

The Attorney General supported IDOL's interpretation. As
stated earlier in this article, one of the purposes of the PWA was
to protect local workers and contractors from competing with
cheap, out-of-state itinerant labor. 27 Under this rubric, an enforcement policy that required a minimum cash wage payment
and did not provide a credit for benefit contributions would be
consistent with the legislative intent of the act.
This interpretation has a significant impact on the calculations of an employee's overtime hourly wages. If an employer was
permitted credit on its cash wage payments for higher than prevailing benefit contributions, a worker could perceivably receive a
smaller overtime rate per hour than if the
company had to pay
28
overtime based on a minimum cash wage.
To buttress his opinion, the Attorney General argued that an
interpretation allowing "shifts of wages from cash to fringe benefits would... weaken the degree to which the Act may be enforced" in light of McHugh.1" 9 The Attorney General's opinion on
this issue is out-of-step with the current trend in ERISA preemption. Courts uniformly find that ERISA preempts the "line by line"
enforcement method of state prevailing wage statues. 3 ° In addition, the trend indicates that the "two tier" and the "total package
(Davis-Bacon)" methods of statutory enforcement are not preempted by ERISA."3 '
Furthermore, McHugh is a case with a narrow scope and
holding. At issue was a union's attempt to use the PWA as a tool

125. Op. Ill. Att'y Gen. No. 93-009 at 3-4.
126. Id. at 5.
127. See supra notes 4 and 6 for a discussion of the PWA's legislative intent.
128. Op. Ill. Att'y Gen. No. 93-009 at 6.
129. Id. at 7-8.
130. See supra notes 60-68, 69, 89-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of
New York, California and Pennsylvania case law, respectively.
131. See supra notes 78-107, 114-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of
California, Pennsylvania and Minnesota case law respectively.
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to collect fringe benefit contributions owed to an employee benefit
fund.
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District's analysis evidenced its reluctance to invalidate the PWA. The court was interested in distinguishing "between State laws that 'relate to' employee benefit plans and those that have only a 'tenuous, remote,
or peripheral' impact" on ERISA plans. 32 After canvassing
ERISA case law (in particular, the decisions reconciling ERISA
with the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act), the Court
concluded that "ERISA preemption is triggered by not just any
indirect effect on administrative procedures, but rather by an
effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans,
such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the
amount of that benefit." 33
The court also recognized that "the regulation of labor costs
in public works projects is surely a valid exercise of a State's traditional regulatory authority, and as such should not be superseded by ERISA 'unless this conclusion is unavoidable.'"'" Thus,
under an analysis comparable to the holdings in Curry and Keystone,. 5 the First Appellate District found that, rather than inthe act, the union's application of the PWA was prevalidating
136
empted.
IV.

APPLYING THE CURRENT TREND IN ERISA PREEMPTION TO
IDOL'S ENFORCEMENT OF THE PREVAILING WAGE ACT

ERISA does not preempt the PWA. The State of Illinois engages in a valid exercise of traditional police powers when it regulates labor costs in public works projects. Thus, at issue is whether IDOL's enforcement of the act (IDOL's interpretation is a state
law for purpose of ERISA) has an indirect effect on a primary
administrative function of an employee benefit plan (e.g., participation, funding, vesting, reporting, disclosure and fiduciary responsibilities) preempted by ERISA.
The case law indicates that IDOL's "line by line" enforcement
of the PWA is preempted by ERISA. IDOL should thus respectfully decline the Attorney General's 1993 opinion'3 7 on this

132. Construction and Gen. Laborers' Dist. Council of Chicago v. James McHuch
Const. Co., 596 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).

133. Id.
134. Id. at 24.
135. Compare McHugh, 596 N.E.2d at 22-24 with Curry, 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
at 510-13 and Keystone, 37 F.3d at 955-63.
136. McHugh, 596 N.E.2d at 22-24.
137. A precedent exists for not adhering to Attorney General opinions interpreting the PWA. See Sparks & Wiewel Constr. Co. v. Martin, 620 N.E.2d 533, 541 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (noting that well reasoned AG opinions are persuasive but do not
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discrete issue, follow the Curry and Keystone courts' lead, and
adopt an interpretation of the PWA that has only a "'tenuous,
remote, or peripheral' impact" to ERISA plans.
There are two reasonable interpretations of the PWA (that
IDOL is free to adopt)13 that are not preempted by ERISA. The
first interpretation is the "two tier" method. This construction of
the PWA is closest to IDOL's administration and enforcement of
the act because it requires a minimum cash wage payment. The
second scheme is the "total package (Davis-Bacon)" method. This
construction is less restrictive on employee/employer negotiations
over compensation packages than the "two tier" method.
IDOL's collection of wages under either interpretation will
require a Tap Electronic139 style review of an employer's books
and records to ascertain whether the company made contributions
to ERISA plans and/or provided non-ERISA benefits to satisfy the
benefits component of the prevailing wage. Such an investigation
may compel IDOL to subpoena trust fund records in a manner
similar to Millan'40 in order to determine whether the trust was

have the force and effect of law); see also Zickuhr v. Bowling, 423 N.E.2d 257, 26061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (disagreeing with an AG opinion defining the phrase "public
use").
138. The Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA) provides, "Each rule that
implements a discretionary power to be exercised by an agency shall include the
standards by which the agency shall exercise the power. The standards shall be
stated as precisely and clearly as practicable under the conditions to inform fully
those persons affected." 5 ILCS 100/5-20 (1994).
An agency may comply with IAPA § 5-20 through rule making, case-by-case
adjudication, or by simply announcing its new principles or policies in a press
release. See, e.g., Boffa v. Ill. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 522 N.E.2d 644, 648-49 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988). See also Illinois Dep't of Transp. v. First Galesburg Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co., 545 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (permitting an agency to refuse
to adopt specific standards for a myriad of different situations), rev'd on different
grounds, 566 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 1990); Escalona v. Board of Trustees, 469 N.E.2d 297,
300-01 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (balancing the practicality of precise standards for every
possible situation with the necessity of an agency to retain flexibility in its decision
making process).
The PWA empowers IDOL with the discretionary power "to inquire diligently
as to any violation of this Act, shall institute actions for penalties herein proscribed, and shall enforce generally the provisions of this Act." 820 ILCS 130/6
(1994). IDOL's rule making authority under the PWA is limited to promulgating
regulations governing the hearings procedure for debarring a contractor or subcontractor from contracting for public works for a two year period. See 820 ILCS
130/11a (1994). See also ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, §§ 100.5 - 100.120 (1994). Thus,
IDOL may adopt one of the two interpretations through either case-by-case adjudication or by announcing the enforcement policy in a press release. IDOL would
most likely achieve greater compliance in this matter from contractors and subcontractors by publicizing its interpretation of the act through speaking engagements
and articles.
139. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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funded or was possibly an attempted subterfuge of the Act. Under
this approach, IDOL's collection of wages would equal the difference between the prevailing cash wage and the cash wages the
employer paid its subject employees (particularly under the "two
tier" method), and the cash equivalent of the difference between
the benefits component of the prevailing wage and any contributions the agency's investigation disclosed that the employer made
to either ERISA or non-ERISA benefits.
CONCLUSION

ERISA preempts state laws that directly or indirectly effect
the participation, funding, vesting, reporting, disclosure and fiduciary responsibilities of an employee benefit plan. Under the current trend in ERISA preemption case law, however, courts are
reluctant to find that ERISA preempts state prevailing wages
statutes. This trend indicates that IDOL's interpretation of the
PWA is preempted by ERISA. Notwithstanding, the PWA is subject to two reasonable interpretations (that IDOL is free to adopt)
that are not preempted under ERISA. IDOL's collection of wages
under either interpretation will require in depth investigations to
ascertain whether an employer is in compliance with the PWA.

